Apart from the infamous terrorist attack in Ankara, the political agenda of the past two weeks has once again been dominated by issues of law and justice. On the first day of October, one citizen was killed, and two police officers were wounded in a bomb attack on the Ministry of Interior and the General Directorate of Security in Ankara. Meanwhile, according to the Interior Minister, “one of the terrorists detonated an explosive device, resulting in his own demise, while the other terrorist was neutralized.Following the attack, the Turkish Foreign Minister issued a strong statement, asserting that the PKK terrorists had entered from Syria. Consequently, any facility associated with the “KK/YPG” in Syria and Iraq had become a legitimate target for Turkey’s security forces. He emphasized that the terrorist organization would come to regret their actions. In the aftermath of the bombing, the Turkish air force conducted a series of airstrikes against PKK targets in northern Iraq and Syria, resulting in the destruction of multiple targets.At the forefront of the legal agenda is the resolution of the Osman Kavala and Gezi Trial, where the Court of Cassation has affirmed the prison sentences of most of the defendants. Consequently, businessman Osman Kavala has been sentenced to aggravated life imprisonment for “attempting to overthrow the government of the Republic of Turkey,” and the eighteen-month prison sentences of MP Can Atalay, Tayfun Kahraman, Mine Özerden, and Çiğdem Mater Utku for aiding and abetting this crime have become final. However, it is worth noting that the judicial process involving Kavala and his associates has been marred by numerous substantive and procedural legal errors from the very beginning.Throughout this process, the principles of a fair trial have been violated on numerous fronts, and there have been some extraordinary anomalies that are not typically observed in judicial proceedings. Osman Kavala was arrested despite the absence of reasonable grounds for suspicion that he had committed the alleged crime. Even though this fact was acknowledged by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), he was not released and remained in detention for an extended period. Furthermore, following Kavala’s acquittal on charges of attempting to overthrow the government, he was subsequently arrested on espionage charges. This paradoxical situation involved Kavala being acquitted of “attempting to overthrow the government” by one court, only to later be convicted of the same offense by another court, with the final conviction being upheld by the Court of Cassation.In terms of the merits of the case, even though the AKP government has labeled the Gezi events as the “Gezi uprising,” there is no legitimate basis for the Gezi defendants to be charged with serious offenses such as “attempting to overthrow” the constitutional order or the government. These events primarily involved peaceful protests where citizens exercised their constitutionally protected rights to assemble and demonstrate. The minor instances of public order violations that occurred during these events can be more accurately described as routine “police incidents.” Furthermore, there was no organized and cohesive group with hierarchical structures aiming to overthrow the government through the use of force and violence.Undoubtedly, the Court of Cassation’s decision to uphold the sentences of Mr. Kavala and his associates has had a detrimental effect in Europe. Concurrently, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe is gearing up to address the Osman Kavala and Gezi Trial during a special session of the plenary scheduled for next week, categorizing it under the title of “urgent matters.” It is probable that a resolution condemning Turkey and/or urging the release of Mr. Kavala may emerge from this session.Another notable issue in this context is the situation of Can Atalay, who received a prison sentence in the Gezi trial but was not permitted to take his oath of office, despite being elected as a Member of Parliament (MP) in the interim. The request made to the Court of Cassation for his release, based on the argument that he should enjoy legislative immunity as an elected MP, was also denied. Subsequently, the matter has been forwarded to the Constitutional Court through an individual application, and it is anticipated that the Constitutional Court will review the application and make a decision during its session on October 12.&nbsp;The latest item on the agenda this time is the constitutional amendment issue, which will likely remain a prominent topic for weeks or even months. As you may be aware, President Erdoğan and the AKP leadership have been urging opposition parties to engage in the creation of a “new and civilian constitution.” During his recent address at the Grand National Assembly’s opening, Erdoğan discussed the objective of “introducing a new and civilian constitution for the nation,” emphasizing a constitution that will guide and enhance the country and society. However, considering the constitutional amendments in 2017 that were made without a democratic process and the subsequent authoritarian practices, which contradicted the principles of constitutionalism, we have valid reasons to be skeptical about a “new” constitution led by the AKP-MHP alliance.Our concerns are significantly heightened by the fact that in the same speech, the objective is to establish a constitution that is “aligned with the fundamental values and red lines of the nation” as well as the (AKP’s) “Century of Turkey goal.” Furthermore, the unconventional model they refer to as the “presidential government system” is depicted as “the culmination of our two-century-long quest for a governance system.” In this context, one might apprehend that the emphasis on a “national” constitution in the same speech aims to create a constitution grounded in conservative family values, potentially resulting in the weakening of gender equality and making it a norm for women to cover their heads. It is also highly probable that other objectives of this “national” constitutional initiative include further bolstering the presidency (potentially by granting Mr. Erdoğan the right to run for office indefinitely) and rendering the Constitutional Court, whose supervisory role has already been substantially diminished, completely powerless.

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